Individual Preference Rankings Compatible with Prices, Income Distributions and Total Resources by Balasko, Yves & Tvede, Mich
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Individual Preference Rankings Compatible with Prices, Income Distributions and Total
Resources
Balasko, Yves; Tvede, Mich
Publication date:
2009
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Balasko, Y., & Tvede, M. (2009). Individual Preference Rankings Compatible with Prices, Income Distributions
and Total Resources. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
Discussion Papers 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark 
Tel.: +45 35 32 30 82 – Fax: +45 35 32 30 00 
http://www.econ.ku.dk 
 
 
ISSN: 1601-2461 (online) 
 
 
No. 09-09 
 
 
 
Individual Preference Rankings Compatible with Prices, 
Income Distributions and Total Resources 
 
 
 
Yves Balasko, Mich Tvede 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
Individual preference rankings compatible with
prices, income distributions and total resources∗
Yves Balasko † Mich Tvede‡
November 2008
Abstract
We consider the problem of determining the individual preference rankings that
are necessarily implied by a dataset consisting of prices, income distributions and total
resources.
We show the equivalence between the compatibility with individual preference
rankings and the existence of a solution to a set of linear equalities and inequalities.
Using this characterization, we give new proofs of the rationalizability of finite data
sets where total resources are close to being collinear and the contractibility and
pathconnectedness of the set that consists of rationalizable finite datasets.
Keywords: Equilibrium manifold, rationalizability, testability, pathconnectedness.
JEL-classification: D1, D5.
1. Introduction
We define the d-triple d =
(
p, (wi), r
)
as a vector whose three components are: a price
vector p, an income distribution vector (wi); a total resource vector r .
In an exchange economy made of m consumers, where consumer i is characterized by
the utility function ui and endowment vector ωi , any arbitrarily given price vector p defines
the d-triple
(
p, (wi), r
)
where wi = p · ωi and r =
∑
i ωi . The (indirect) utility of the
d-triple d =
(
p, (wi), r
)
for consumer i is given by the expression vˆi(d) = uˆi(p, wi) where
uˆi is the indirect utility function associated with the direct utility function ui .
A dataset D consists of a finite number T of d-triples d t =
(
pt , (w ti ), r
t
)
, with t ∈
T = {1, . . . , T}. The ranking
vˆi(d
t1) ≤ vˆi(d t2) ≤ · · · ≤ vˆi(d tT )
of the indirect utility levels vˆi(d
t) reflects the preference ranking of the dataset D by
consumer i , with i varying from 1 to m.
∗This paper is an expanded version of a paper circulated in 2003 that contains the first reference to and
proof of the linear programming characterization of ranking compatibility [2]. We are grateful to a referee
of this Journal for valuable comments and suggestions.
†Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, U.K., email: yb501@york.ac.uk
‡Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, email: Mich.Tvede@econ.ku.dk
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We consider in this paper the inverse problem of determining the individual preference
rankings that are necessarily implied by a given dataset D despite the fact that individual
utility functions are unknown. This problem requires the determination of the utility
functions that rationalize the dataset D and may have many as well as zero solutions.
Different rankings can be compatible with the dataset D and the issue in this paper is to
determine them.
It is known that the equilibrium manifold determines the consumers’ preferences [1, 5].
But the minimum this requires are the points of an open subset of the equilibrium manifold,
i.e., an infinite number of points. If the dataset T is finite, the only results available so
far are those about the “testability” of the equilibrium manifold [4]. There is a big gap
between the determination of consumers’ preferences and the testability issue. That gap
is partially filled in by the results of the current paper on the determination of the individual
rankings compatible with a finite dataset D
In applications, prices, individual incomes and aggregate demand are observable. Utility
functions or preferences are not. The determination of the individual preference rankings
compatible with finite datasets is therefore a precious information that is of particular
interest in cost-benefit analyses and public finance for example.
The main result of this paper is the equivalence between rankings of finite datasets
and existence of solutions to a set of linear equalities and inequalities. This problem has
a remarkable structure from which follows that its computational complexity is relatively
modest. We use this characterization to improve our understanding of the set of finite
datasets compatible with given individual rankings. We show that this set is open, which
implies that the compatibility of a dataset with given individual rankings is robust to
perturbations. We also prove that this set is contractible, which implies in particular
that it is pathconnected. The economic interest of global topological properties like
contractibility, pathconnectedness and more generally, the nature of the various homology
, cohomology and homotopy groups that make up the core of algebraic topology may
seem remote to many economists. Nevertheless, once an economically relevant property
has been identified and, here, this property is the compatibility of finite datasets with given
individual rankings, the property can be identified with the set of suitably defined elements
that satisfy that property. At an abstract level, this set is usually a subset of some bigger
set and the issue is then to get the best “understanding” possible of that subset. For
example, if equations and inequations are often used to characterize subsets of a given
set, it is generally not an easy task to determine from their equations and inequations the
“picture” of the subsets. Global topological properties are the tools that mathematicians
have invented to bypass our visual limitations in dimensions higher than three. From that
perspective, contractibility of the set of finite datasets compatible with given individual
rankings is quite remarkable. Though not convex, this set has already many of the nice
properties of convex sets. We also use our characterization to give an alternative proofs
of the rationalizability of finite data sets when total resources are close to being collinear
[3].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the main assumptions and
definitions, and set the notation. Section 3 addresses the equivalence between the com-
patibility of finite datasets with specified individual rankings and the existence of solutions
to some set of linear equalities and inequalities. Section 4 is devoted to a proof that finite
datasets where total resources are collinear or almost collinear are rationalizable. Section
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5 deals with the contractibility and pathconnectedness of the set of datasets compatible
with a given individual rankings, a property that is applied to show the pathconnectedness
of the set of rationalizable datasets. Section 6 concludes the paper with a few comments.
The concepts of well ranked and strongly ranked datasets are defined in the Appendix.
Their properties are a crucial ingredient of our characterization of dataset rankings.
2. Definitions, assumptions and notation
Goods and prices
There is a finite number ` of goods. Let p = (p1, p2, . . . , p`−1, p`) ∈ R`++ be the price
vector. We normalize the price vector p by picking the `-th commodity as the numeraire:
p` = 1. Let S denote the set of strictly positive normalized price vectors.
Consumers and their utility functions
There is a finite number m ≥ 2 of consumers. A consumer is characterized by the
consumption set X = R`++, an endowment vector ωi ∈ X and a utility function ui : X → R.
We assume that consumer i ’s utility function ui belongs to the class U of smooth maps
from X into R that satisfy the following properties whose mathematical and economic
interpretations are standard: 1) Dui(xi) ∈ X for any xi ∈ X (smooth monotonicity); 2)
The combined inequality yTD2ui(xi) y ≥ 0 and equality yTDui(xi) = 0, where xi ∈ X,
have a unique solution y = 0 ∈ R` (smooth strict quasi-concavity); 3) The indifference
surfaces u−1i (a) are closed in R` for all a ∈ R. (The latter condition does not follow
from the continuity of ui because the consumption space X is open in R`, not closed;
economically, this property means that every commodity is strictly necessary.)
We denote by Ω = Xm the set of endowments of all consumers.
Individual demand functions
Given the utility function ui ∈ U, the demand of consumer i for the price vector p ∈ S and
income wi > 0 is fi(p, wi) = arg max ui(xi) subject to the budget constraint p · xi ≤ wi .
Walras law is the identity p · fi(p, wi) = wi .
Let ω = (ωi) ∈ Ω denote the vector of individual endowments. The equilibrium
manifold is the subset of S×Ω that consists of the elements (p, ω) that satisfy equation∑
i
fi(p, p · ωi) =
∑
i
ωi . (1)
Feasible and equilibrium d-triples
Let (wi) ∈ Rm++ denote the income distribution between the m consumers making up the
economy.
The d-triple (p, (wi), r) ∈ S × Rm++ ×X is feasible if the equality
w1 + w2 + · · ·+ wm = p · r (2)
is satisfied. Note that the definition of feasibility does not require utility functions.
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The d-triple (p, (wi), r) ∈ S ×Rm++×X is an equilibrium d-triple for the utility profile
u = (ui) ∈ Um if the equality ∑
i
fi(p, wi) = r (3)
is satisfied. It follows from Walras law satisfied by the individual demand functions that
an equilibrium d-triple is feasible.
Datasets
From now on, we consider datasets D = (d t)1≤t≤T consisting of T pairwise distinct
feasible d-triples d t = (pt , (wi)
t , r t) ∈ S × Rm++ × X. The set of these datasets is
denoted by D while E(u)[T ] represents the subset of elements of D whose components
are equilibrium d-triples for the utility profile u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Um. The utility profile
u = (ui) ∈ Um then rationalizes the dataset D. We also introduce the set E[T ] of
rationalizable datasets D ∈ D. We have E[T ] = ∪u∈UmE(u)[T ].
Datasets and compatible preference (pre)orderings
Let D ∈ E(u)[T ]. The ranking
vˆi(d
t1) ≤ vˆi(d t2) ≤ · · · ≤ vˆi(d tT )
of the indirect utility levels vˆi(d
t) defines a preordering i on the set T. The consumers’
preference preorderings of the dataset D (given the utility profile u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Um)
is the m-tuple = (i) defined by the m consumers’ preorderings of the set T.
An ordering is a preordering that is antisymmetric (i.e., t i t ′ and t ′ i t imply
t = t ′). The ordering ≺i is a refinement of the preordering i if t ≺i t ′ implies t i t ′.
Note that any preordering can be refined into an ordering.
It will be important in the sequel to differentiate orderings from preorderings. We will
use the notation ≺= (≺i) for orderings of the dataset D.
3. Compatibility of datasets and preference (pre)orderings
The main result of this section is the equivalence between the compatibility of a given
dataset D with the preference ordering ≺= (≺i) and the solution of a set of linear
equalities and inequalities.
3.1. A set of linear equalities and inequalities
Theorem 1. Let ≺= (≺i) be some preference ordering of the set T. Let D = (d t) ∈ D
be a dataset made of T feasible d-triples.
There exists a utility profile u = (u1, u2, . . . , um) ∈ Um inducing the preference ordering
≺= (≺i) if and only if the system of linear equalities and inequalities
LP (D,≺) :

pt
′ · x ti > w t
′
i whenever t
′ ≺i t; (L1)
pt · x ti = w ti ; (L2)∑
i x
t
i = r
t . (L3)
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has a solution
{
(x ti )
}
, with 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. The condition is necessary. Let x ti = fi(p
t , w ti ). Equality (L3) follows from the
equilibrium condition. Equality (L2) follows from Walras law. Inequality (L1) then follows
from inequality ui(x
t ′
i ) < ui(x
t
i ).
The condition is sufficient. Pick some arbitrary consumer i . We use equality (L2) to
substitute pt ·x ti to w ti in inequality (L1). The collection of inequalities (L1) implies that the
data (pt , x ti ) are well-ranked for the ordered index set (T,≺i) = {ti1 ≺i ti2 ≺i · · · ≺i tiT } in
the sense of Definition A.1 of the Appendix. It then suffices to apply Proposition A.2 of
the Appendix to rationalize these data by some utility function ui ∈ U with the property
that the strict inequality ui(x
t ′
i ) < ui(x
t
i ) is equivalent to t
′ ≺i t. It then suffices to do
this for every consumer. Equality (L3) implies that the equilibrium condition is satisfied
for every t varying from 1 to T .
3.2. Extension to preference preorderings
The following Proposition enables us to use Theorem 1 in the case of preorderings instead
of orderings.
Proposition 1. Let = (i) be some preference preordering of the set T associated with
the utility profile u = (ui) ∈ Um. Then, for any ordering ≺= (≺i) that is a refinement
of the preordering = (i), there exists a utility profile u′ = (u′i ) ∈ Um such that
the dataset D belongs to E[T ](u′) and the induced preference ranking coincides with the
ordering ≺= (≺i).
Proof. This is essentially Proposition A.8 of the Appendix.
The following corollary is just a reformulation of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Any dataset D that is rationalized by the utility profile u = (ui) that induces
a preference preordering can be rationalized by another utility profile u′ = (u′i ) such that
the induced preference preordering of the datasets is actually an ordering.
Proposition 1 enables us to check the compatibility of the datasetD with the preference
preordering = (i) by reducing this question to the compatibility of the dataset D with
any preference ordering ( ≺) = (≺i) that is a refinement of = (i). We solve the latter
question by applying Theorem 1.
3.3. Structure and size of the linear programming problem
Checking whether the linear system LP (D,≺) has a solution is equivalent to solving a
linear programming problem. This problem has m `T real unknowns and m `T + ` T +
mT (T + 1)/2 constraints (including the sign constraints). For a given economy, m and
` are constant and the only variable parameter is the number T of equilibrium data. The
numbers of unknowns and constraints are linear and quadratic respectively in T . This
situation is similar to the one observed by Varian [7] for Afriat’s inequalities in the case
of one consumer. But, at variance with Afriat’s set of inequalities that are practically
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impossible to solve for large T because of the size of the problem, the set of inequalities
and equalities in Theorem (1) decomposes into T smaller linear subproblems.
The number of unknowns of each subproblem is equal to `m while the number of
constraints varies from m`+ `+m to m `+ `+mT depending on the value of t and of
the ranking profile ≺. The average value of the number of constraints is therefore equal
to m` + ` + mT/2. Both average and maximal values are linear in T . This makes each
one of the linear subproblems far more tractable than the general problem, an advantage
that more than compensates for the fact that there exist T such problems.
4. The set of rationalizable datasets and related sets
Given the preference ordering ≺= (≺i), we denote by
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) the set of T pairwise
distinct datasets D ∈ D that are compatible with the preference ordering ≺. It would
be most interesting to have a precise description of the set
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) as as subset of D.
Such description is impossible. The best we can hope for at the moment are some global
topological properties of the set
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) like pathconnectedness or contractibility. We
investigate these properties using the characterization provided by Theorem 1.
Recall that E[T ] denotes the set of T pairwise distinct rationalizable datasets D ∈ D.
We then have:
Proposition 2.
E[T ] =
⋃
≺
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺).
Proof. Obvious given Proposition 1 and the discussion that followed.
Proposition 2 enables us to derive properties of the set of rationalizable data E[T ] from
those of the sets (E[T ]
∣∣≺), sets for which we can use Theorem 1.
4.1. Openness of the set of datasets compatible with a given prefer-
ence preordering
Theorem 1 tells us that the set
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) consists of the datasets D such that the set
defined by the linear system LP (D,≺) is non empty. We are going to apply this charac-
terization to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The set
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) is open.
Proof. Let us show that if D′ = (p
′t , (w
′t
i ), r
′t) ∈ D is a dataset close enough to D, then
the set defined by LP (D′,≺) is also non empty. The idea is to perturb the solution x of
LP (D,≺) into a solution x ′ of LP (D′,≺). Define x¯ ti = (x1ti , x2ti , . . . , x `−1 ti ) consisting of
the first ` − 1 coordinates of x ti . For i varying from 1 to m − 1, let x
′` t
i = w
′t
i − p¯
′t · x¯ ti
where p¯
′t = (p
′t
1 , . . . , p
′t
`−1) and x
′t
i = (x¯
t
i , x
′`t
i ). Then, define x
′t
m by
x
′t
m = r
′t −
m−1∑
i=1
x
′t
i .
Equalities L2 and L3 are satisfied by construction and L1 is satisfied because these in-
equalities are strict for D′ sufficiently close to D.
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An obvious consequence of this proposition is:
Corollary 2. The set of rationalizable datasets E[T ] is open in D.
4.2. Rationalizability of datasets with collinear total resources
Theorem 2. Let D = (d t)1≤t≤T be a dataset such that the total resources r t are all
collinear. The dataset D is then rationalizable.
The vectors of total resources r t are all collinear with some vector r ∈ X. Let us
define x ti ∈ X and λti > 0 by
x ti =
w ti
pt · r t r
t = λti r.
The following lemma is obvious:
Lemma 1. Generically on D, the λti are pairwise distinct.
Proof of Theorem 2. It follows from Lemma 1 combined with Proposition 3 that we can
assume that the dataset D is such that the λti ’s are pairwise distinct. They then define
for each consumer i the ordering ≺i of the set T:
λt1i < λ
t2
i < · · · < λtTi .
It then suffices to check that (x ti ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ T is a solution of the linear
system LP (D,≺), which is obvious.
5. Topological properties of sets of compatible and ratio-
nalizable datasets
We now apply Theorem 1 to get a simple proof of the contractibility of
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺). In a sec-
ond stage, this property is used to prove the pathconnectedness of the set of rationalizable
datasets E[T ].
5.1. Contractibility of
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺)
Proposition 4. The set
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) is contractible.
The topological space Z is said to be contractible if there exists a continuous map
h : Z × [0, 1] → Z that satisfies the following properties: 1) h(., 1) is the identity map
of Z, i.e., h(., 1) = idZ; 2) h(z, 0) = z0 ∈ Z for z ∈ Z and some z0 ∈ Z. The intuition
behind this definition is that a contractible space can be continuously deformed into a
point, here the point z0.
A related idea is the one of a deformation retract. By definition, the topological
subspace Z0 of Z is a deformation retract if there exists a continuous map h : Z ×
[0, 1]→ Z that satisfies the following properties: 1) h(., 1) is the identity map of Z, i.e.,
h(., 1) = idZ; 2) h(z, 0) ∈ Z0 for z ∈ Z; 3) h(z, 0) = z for all z ∈ Z0. If the subspace
Z0 is a deformation retract of Z and is contractible, then Z is also contractible. (First,
contract Z to Z0, and then Z0 to a point.)
It is intuitively clear and almost obvious that a contractible space is pathconnected.
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Lemma 2. Let D =
(
(pt , (w ti ), r
t)
) ∈ (E[T ]∣∣≺) and D∗ = ((pt , (w ∗ti ), r ∗t)) ∈ (E[T ]∣∣≺).
Then, for any real number λ ∈ [0, 1], the dataset D(λ) = λD + (1 − λ)D∗ belongs to(
E[T ]
∣∣≺).
Proof. It suffices to observe that the linear system LP (D,≺) in Theorem 1 is linear with
respect to x ti and w
t
i .
We now define special datasets that belong to the set
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) for a given ordering
≺= (≺i). Let ti1 ≺i ti2 ≺i · · · ≺i tiT represent the ordering ≺i . Let (µti1 , µti2 , . . . , µtiT ) be
a strictly increasing sequence of strictly positive (real) numbers:
0 < µti1 < µti2 < · · · < µtiT .
Let τi ∈ X be some strictly positive vector. Define the vector x∗ti = µtτi ∈ X. The
sequence x∗ti satisfies the strict (vector) inequalities
x
∗ti1
i < x
∗ti2
i < · · · < x
∗tiT
i .
Let p = (pt), with pt ∈ S for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Define w ∗ti = pt · x∗ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
r ∗t =
∑
i x
∗t
i . We denote by D
∗(p) the dataset (pt , (w ∗ti ), r
∗t).
Lemma 3. The dataset D∗(p) = (pt , w ∗, r ∗) belongs to
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) for any p = (pt) ∈ ST .
Proof. This is essentially a rehash of Theorem 2.
Proof of the contractibility property
Proof of Proposition 4. Let X0 be the subset of
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) consisting of the datasets D∗(p)
where the price sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . , pT ) is varied in ST . The map p → D∗(p) is
continuous. The inverse map is the projection (pt , (w ti ), r
t)→ p = (pt). These two maps
are continuous, which proves that X0 is homeomorphic to S
m and is therefore contractible
as a Cartesian product of contractible spaces.
We now define the map h :
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺)× [0, 1]→ (E[T ]∣∣≺) by
h(D,λ) = λD + (1− λ)D∗(p)
where p = (pt) is fixed. This map is clearly continuous. In addition, h(D, 1) = D,
h(D, 0) = D∗(p) ∈ X0, and for D = D∗(p), it comes h(D∗(p), λ) = D∗(p). The set X0 is
therefore a deformation retract of
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) by the map h. The set X0 being contractible,
the set
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) itself is contractible.
5.2. Pathconnectedness of the set of rationalizable datasets
Lemma 4. The intersection ⋂
≺
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺)
is non empty.
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Proof. The idea of the proof is to identify a dataset D˜ ∈ E[T ] that is compatible with all
possible preference orderings ≺.
Step 1. Let u ∈ U be some arbitrary utility function. Let x1, x2, . . . , x t , . . . , xT be T
distinct consumption bundles in X yielding the same utility level: u(x1) = u(x2) = · · · =
u(x t) = · · · = u(xT )). Let pt be the supporting price vector of x t for t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
The strict inequality pt · x t < pt · x t ′ for t 6= t ′ follows from the strict quasi-concavity
of the utility function u combined with x t 6= x t ′ (and u(x t) = u(x t ′)).
Step 2. These inequalities imply as a special case the inequalities
pt · x t < pt · x t ′ for 1 ≤ t ≺i t ′ ≤ T
for any ordering ≺i of T = {1, 2, . . . , T}.
Step 3. Let D˜ be the dataset (p˜t , (w˜ ti ), r˜
t) where p˜t = pt , w˜ ti = p˜
t · x t , and r˜ t = mx t
for t varying from 1 to T . Let also u = (u, u, . . . , u) denote the utility profile associated
with each consumer having u ∈ U as utility function.
Let x ti = x
t for i = 1, 2, . . . , m and t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Then, it is obvious that (x ti ) with
1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ T is a solution of the linear system LP (D˜,≺) for any preference
ordering ≺. We conclude by applying Theorem 1.
We can now prove:
Proposition 5. The set of rationalizable datasets E[T ] is pathconnected.
Proof. The set E[T ] is the union of the path-connected sets
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺) for all preference
orderings ≺= (≺i). These sets have a non empty intersection by Lemma 4. Let D˜
be some element of the intersection ∩≺
(
E[T ]
∣∣≺). It then suffices to join the datasets
D ∈ (E[T ]∣∣≺) and D′ ∈ (E[T ]∣∣≺′) to the element D˜ by two continuous paths contained
in
(
ET ]
∣∣≺) and (ET ]∣∣≺′) respectively to define a continuous path in E[T ] linking the two
datasets D and D′.
6. Concluding comments
The analysis developed in this paper has been limited to the pure exchange model. Obvi-
ously, serious attempts at applying our analysis to real world data should consider extending
our theoretical results to economies that are more complex than the pure exchange ones.
Production should explicitely be taken into account. More generally, theoretical develop-
ments should exploit the structures induced by time and uncertainty up to the operation
of asset markets. This paper should be seen as a feasibility study for such an approach.
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A. Rationalizability of well-ranked individual price-consumption data
We consider a set of individual price-consumption data (pt , x ti ) indexed by a set I. The index set I is
equipped with an ordering denoted by ≺.
The utility function ui : X → R rationalizes the set of individual price-consumption data {(pt , x ti ) with
t ∈ I if
ui(x
t
i ) = max ui(xi) subject to p
t · xi ≤ pt · x ti
for t ∈ I.
A.1. Well-ranked individual data for a specified ordering
Definition A. 1. The individual price-consumption data (pt , x ti ) with t ∈ I is well-ranked for the ordering
≺ of the index set I if the strict inequality
pt · x ti < pt · x t
′
i (4)
is satisfied whenever t ≺ t ′.
Note that the property of being well-ranked depends on the ordering ≺ on I.
Proposition A. 2. Any set of well-ranked individual price-consumption data for the ordered index set (I,≺)
can be rationalized by some utility function ui ∈ U.
Proof. There is no loss of generality if we identify the index set I to the set of integers T = {1, 2, . . . , T}
and the order ≺ to the ordinary 1 < 2 < · · · < T .
It follows from [6] that it suffices that the data can be rationalized by a piecewise-linear utility function.
(The domain of the utility function in [6] is a compact subset of the strictly positive orthant X = R`++; this
domain has to be extended here to X, which is straightforward.)
The idea is therefore to find a function of the form
ui(xi) = inf
1≤t≤T
at + btp
t · xi
where at and bt are > 0 and such that the strict inequality
at + btp
t · x ti < at ′ + bt ′pt
′ · x ti (5)
is satisfied for every t and t ′ where 1 ≤ t 6= t ′ ≤ T .
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It follows readily from the (T − 1)2 inequalities (5) that x ti is supported for the utility function ui by
the price vector pt , with 1 ≤ t ≤ T . This implies that the price-consumption data are rationalized by the
utility function ui ∈ Upl.
The proof consists therefore in finding these coefficients at and bt with 1 ≤ t ≤ T . It starts with a1
and b1 arbitrary > 0, the computation of the other coefficients proceeding by induction on T .
Case T = 2. Let a2 = a1 + b1p
1 · x1i . The goal is to find b2 such that the two inequalities
a1 + b1p
1 · x1i < a2 + b2p2 · x1i (6)
a2 + b2p
2 · x2i < a1 + b1p1 · x2i (7)
are satisfied.
Inequality (6) is satisfied for any b2 > 0 since a2 = a1 +b1p
1 ·x1i and p1 ·x1i > 0 from x1i 6= 0. Inequality
a2 < a1 + b1p
1 · x2i is equivalent to a1 + b1p1 · x1i < a1 + b1p1 · x2i , itself equivalent to p1 · x1i < p1 · x2i ,
inequality that follows from the fact that the dataset D is strongly well-ranked. It then suffices to pick
b2 > 0 small enough for the strict inequality
b2p
2 · x2i < b1p1 · (x2i − x1i )
to be satisfied.
T arbitrary. We now use the induction assumption for T −1. With a1 > 0 and b1 > 0 arbitrary, there exists
a2, . . . , aT−1 and b2, . . . , bT−1, all > 0, with at = at−1 + bt−1pt−1 · x t−1i for 2 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, such that
inequality (5) is satisfied for 0 ≤ t 6= t ′ ≤ T − 1.
Let aT = aT−1 + bT−1pT−1 · xT−1i . We have a0 < a1 < · · · < aT−1 < aT since each btpt · x ti is > 0.
Inequality at + btp
t · x ti ≤ aT + bT pT · x ti , t ≤ T − 1.
It follows from the monotonicity of the sequence at that inequality
at + btp
t · x ti = at+1 ≤ aT + bT pT · x ti
is satisfied for any t ≤ T − 1 and any bT > 0.
Inequality aT < at + btp
t · xTi , t ≤ T − 1.
By the induction assumption, inequality
aT < at + btp
t · xT−1i (8)
is satisfied for t < T − 1. The price-consumption data are well-ranked, which implies the strict inequality
pt · xT−1i < pt · xTi from which follows the strict inequality at +btpt · xT−1i < at +btpt · xTi which, combined
with inequality (8), yields
aT = aT−1 + bT−1pT−1 · xT−1i < at + btpt · xTi (9)
for t < T − 1.
If follows from inequality (9) that it suffices to pick bT > 0 such that
bT p
T · xTi < inf
1≤t≤T−1
(at + btp
t · xTi − aT )
to have the inequalities
aT + bT p
T · xTi < at + btpt · xTi (10)
satisfied for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Proposition A. 3. Let (pt , x ti ) with t = 1, 2, . . . , T be a set of pairwise distinct price-consumption data
(i.e., (pt , x ti ) 6= (pt
′
, x t
′
i ) for t 6= t ′) rationalized by a utility function ui ∈ U and such that the inequalities
ui(x
1
i ) ≤ ui(x2i ) ≤ · · · ≤ ui(xTi )
are satisfied. Then these data are well-ranked for the ordered index set (T, <) = {1 < 2 < · · · < T}.
Proof. Let t be arbitrary between 1 and T . For any t ′ > t, we have ui(x ti ) ≤ ui(x t
′
i ). This implies the
inequality pt · x ti ≤ pt · x t
′
i . This inequality is strict for t 6= t ′ because the utility function ui is strictly
quasi-concave and x ti 6= x t
′
i .
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A.2. Strongly ranked individual data for a given ordering
The utility function whose existence is established in Proposition A.2 does not guarantee us that the utility
levels ui(x
t
i ) are strictly increasing
ui(x
1
i ) ≤ ui(x2i ) ≤ · · · ≤ ui(xTi ) (11)
when the individual price-consumption data are well-ranked for the index set (T, <).
This leads us to strengthen the concept of well-ranked data set with respect to an ordered index set as
follows:
Definition A. 4. The individual price-consumption data (pt , x ti ) indexed by the ordered set (T, <) are
strongly ranked if, in addition to being well-ranked, they satisfy the inequality
pt+1 · x ti ≤ pt+1 · x t+1i
for every t 6= T .
A set of indexed data can be well-ranked without being strongly ranked. The following proposition reflects
the additional information associated with strongly ranked data.
Proposition A. 5. Let (pt , x ti ) be strongly ranked data for the ordered index set (T, <) = {1 < 2 < · · · <
T}. Then, the strict inequalities
ui(x
1
i ) < ui(x
2
i ) < · · · < ui(xTi ) (12)
are satisfied for any utility function ui ∈ U that rationalizes these data.
Proof. It follows from the definition of strongly ranked data sets that the inequality
pt · x t−1i ≤ pt · x ti
is satisfied for t 6= 1. It then follows from x t−1i 6= x ti that we have
ui(x
t−1
i ) < ui(x
t
i )
for t 6= 1.
By Proposition A.2, any well-ranked data set is rationalizable by some utility function ui ∈ U.
It follows from Proposition 5 that the utility rankings of the commodity bundles x ti are independent of
the utility function ui ∈ U that rationalizes the strongly ranked price-consumption data (pt , x ti ).
In the next proposition, we see that, if well-ranked data are not always strongly ranked, it is nevertheless
possible to embed these well-ranked data into a larger set of strongly ranked data.
Proposition A. 6. Any set of well-ranked data for the ordered index set (T, <) = {1, 2, . . . , T} can be
embedded into some larger set of strongly ranked data for some ordered index set (J,≺) (with T ⊂ J), with
1 being the smallest element of (J,≺).
Proof. The proof works by induction on T , the number of well-ranked data. For T = 1, there is nothing to
prove because any data set of one element is well-ranked and strongly ranked.
Induction argument for T arbitrary. The induction hypothesis can be stated as follows: any set of T well-
ranked data (pt , x ti ) for the ordered index set (T, <) = {1 < 2 < · · · < T} can be embedded into a larger
set of strongly ranked data for the ordered index set (J,≺) whose smallest element is the element 1, the
smallest element of the set I. This property is assumed to be satisfied for T − 1, and we establish that it
is then true for T .
Let therefore T well-ranked data (pt , x ti ) for the ordered set (T, <) = {1 < 2 < · · · < T}. The T − 1
data (pt , x ti ) indexed by the ordered subset (I
′, <) = {2 < 3 < · · · < T} are also well-ranked. Therefore,
by the induction assumption, we can embed these T −1 data into a larger set of strongly ordered data with
an ordered index set (J ′,≺) whose smallest element is the element 2 ∈ (I ′, <).
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One checks readily that these strongly ranked data and the pair (p1, x1i ) of the original data set define
a set of data that are well-ranked for the ordered set (J ′′,≺) = {1} ∪ (J ′,≺) with 1 ≺ t for t ∈ J ′.
Let us show that these data are either strongly ranked for the ordered index set (J ′′,≺) or that we
can find an additional pair (pA12 , xA12i ) such that the data set consisting of (p
1, x1i ), (p
A12 , xA12i ), and the
subsequent (pt , x ti ) for t ∈ J ′ are strongly ranked for the ordered index set (J,≺) = {1 ≺ A12 ≺ 2}∪(J ′,≺).
If the inequality p2 · x1i ≤ p2 · x2i is satisfied, then the full data set is clearly strongly ranked for the
ordered index set (J ′′,≺) and there is nothing more to prove. (It suffices to take (J,≺) = (J ′′,≺), and to
observe that 1 is the smallest element of both index set (T, <) and (J,≺).)
Assume now that the inequality p2 · x1i > p2 · x2i is satisfied. Define  = inf2≤t≤T p1 · (x ti − x1i ). Let us
show that there exists some xA12i ∈ R`++ that satisfies the following equalities:
p1 · xA12i = p1 · x1i + /2 , p2 · xA12i ≤ p2 · x2i (13)
The set
{xi ∈ X | p2 · xi ≤ p2 · x2i }
is convex and bounded from below by 0, contains elements arbitrarily close to 0, and also contains the point
x2i . The image of this set by the linear map xi → p1 · xi is therefore an interval of the form (0, A]. Now
p1 · x2i belongs to this interval as the image of the point x2i . This implies that p1 · x1i + /2 also belongs
to this interval by the definition of , which proves the existence of some point xA12i satisfying the above
equalities and inequalities.
Set pA12 = p1. Let us now show that the set consisting of (p1, x1i ), (p
A12 , xA12i ), and of the data (p
t , x ti )
for t ∈ J ′ is strongly ranked with the respect to the ordered index set (J,≺) = {1 < A12 < 2}∪ (J ′,≺). By
construction, we have p1 · x1i ≤ p1 · xA12i = p1 · x1i + /2 and pA12 · xA12i = p1 · xA12i = p1 · x1i + /2 < pA12 · x ti
for t ≥ 2, which proves that these data are indeed well-ranked. The inequality
pA12 · x1i = p1 · x1i ≤ p1 · x1i + /2 = p1 · xA12i = pA12 · xA12i
and the inequality
p2 · xA12i ≤ p2 · x2i
are satisfied by construction. These inequalities combined with the strong ranking of the data for t ≥ 2
imply that these data are strongly ranked for the ordered index set (J,≺) = {1 < A12 < 2 < · · · < T}.
Note that the element 1 is the smallest element of the ordered set (J,≺).
Proposition A. 7. Any set of well-ranked data (pt , x ti ) for the ordered index set (T, <) is rationalizable by
a utility function ui ∈ U for which the strict inequalities
ui(x
1
i ) < ui(x
2
i ) < · · · < ui(xTi )
are satisfied.
Proof. These data being well-ranked for the ordered index set (T, <) = {1 < 2 < · · · < T}, it follows
from Proposition A.6 that they can be embedded into a larger set of strongly ranked data indexed by some
ordered indexed set (J,<), with (T, <) ⊂ (J,≺). The strict inequalities of the Proposition then follow from
the fact that the order of T is the restriction of the order of J.
Proposition A. 8. Let (pt , x ti ) with t = 1, 2, . . . , T be a set of pairwise distinct data (i.e., (p
t , x ti ) 6= (pt
′
, x t
′
i )
for t 6= t ′) rationalized by some utility function ui ∈ U and such that the weak inequalities
ui(x
1
i ) ≤ ui(x2i ) ≤ · · · ≤ ui(xTi )
are satisfied. Then these data can be rationalized by a utility function u˜i ∈ U such that the strict inequalities
u˜i(x
1
i ) < u˜i(x
2
i ) < · · · < u˜i(xTi )
are satisfied.
Proof. By Proposition A.3, the data are well-ranked for the ordered index set (T, <) = {1 < 2 < · · · < T}.
It then follows from Proposition A.7 that there exists a utility function u˜i ∈ U that rationalizes the T pairs
(pt , x ti ) (for t = 1, . . . , T ) and such that the strict inequalities
u˜i(x
1
i ) < u˜i(x
2
i ) < · · · < u˜i(xTi )
are satisfied.
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